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TODAY’S AGENDA
What the NZ experience of the 1990s reveals for 
England’s NHS Foundation Trusts
How observation of the NHS hospital reforms might 
inform institutional design for New Zealand’s 
public hospitals
“It is in pursuit of high standards, greater local 
accountability, genuine public ownership, greater 
emphasis on local service provision to tackle 
health inequalities, that we are bringing forward 
proposals for NHS Foundation Trusts”
The Rt Hon Alan Milburn, MP
Secretary of State for Health
December 2002
THE NHS ‘PROBLEM’
System perceived to be
 Dominated by decisionmaking in, edicts from, Whitehall
 Inflexible
 Inefficent 
Hospitals perceived to be
 Inefficient as a result of poor management practices
 Unresponsive to patient needs and concerns 
An agenda for structural reform
 Devolving control and management of top-performing 
NHS hospitals onto “independent public interest 
organisations, modelled on co-operative societies and 
mutual organisations” 
CONSTRAINTS TO REFORM
Hospital services must be free to the patient
Health service assets acquired by the state must 
remain in public ownership and control
Hospitals must be part of the NHS
 funded centrally to a national schedule for service 
quantities and qualities negotiated with Primary Care 
Trusts
 “be there to treat patients not to make profits or distribute 
dividends”
 “treat patients according to NHS principles and NHS 
standards”
 subject to NHS systems of inspection
PROPOSED NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS
Separation of purchasing (Primary Care Trusts) 
from provisioning (NHS Foundation Trusts)
Governance and management devolved 
 Onto local citizen members (voluntary membership)
 Representing local communities (residence and interest)
 Accountable to members via elections and constitutional 
processes
 Subject to financial, safety, quality audits 
A more corporate-style structure? 
 Comparison with private nonprofit hospitals
A FAMILIAR STORY?
NZ health reforms in the 1990s
 Hospitals inefficient, poorly-managed (Arthur Anderson)
 Unresponsive to local needs (Hospitals and Related Services Taskforce)
 Introduction of the Purchaser-provider split/Quasi-market
 Removal of hospitals from central control (creation of CHEs with 
independent boards, contracting to provide services negotiated with 
RHAs)
 But retention of state ownership (despite contracting of some 
services to the private sector)
 Continuation of central standards-setting, accountability
 Community consultation on quantity/quality of services provided,
regional/cultural/other sensitivities in purchasing/provision
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
Patients = originating principals (customers)
Benefits from nonprofit ownership
 Overcoming information asymmetry between patients and 
doctors (Hansmann)
But require organisational instruments to overcome 
inefficiencies from lack of ownership interest
 Conflicts from separation of legal, beneficial ownership
 Information to substitute for absence of markets for shares
 Increased importance of markets for products, factors (Jensen)
Strength/effective monitoring of fiduciary duties (Fama and Jensen)
TYPICAL PRIVATE NONPROFIT HOSPTIALS
Governance mechanisms
 Single-issue boards; direct legal accountability to members
Members, boards ‘buy in’ to organisational mission
 Trading signals
Patient substitutions (product markets)
Donor defections (factor markets)
 Failure to meet objectives leads to failure of the organisation
Members lose opportunity to fulfill missionary objectives
 Risks, costs of poor decisions borne by board, managers, 
members
Reputational consequences of poor performance 
Difficulty recruiting high quality board members
NZ REFORMS PERCEIVED TO HAVE FAILED:
PROMISED EFFICIENCY, SERVICE GAINS FEW 
Systemic, rather than structural, problems (Howell, 2000)
 Board members appointed by Minister
Supply of board members guaranteed
Complex chain of accountabilities
 Inability for patients to share risks across the political boundary
Questionable efficiency of risk-sharing between purchasers, providers
Dual local geographic monopolies (purchaser/provider)
 Captive market (absence of patient, purchaser substitutions)
 Traditional risks of failure absent (political risks too great)
 No incentives to collect information about trading risks – loss of 
information from which improvements could be made
 Concentration on performing to incentivised targets – financial 
performance, waiting list targets
CONSEQUENCES
Purchaser-Provider split poses information problems
 Consultation mechanisms used to define services focused at 
purchaser level
 Hospitals had to ‘purchase’ info from RHAs or recreate it 
(adversarial process)
Patient disenfranchisement
 Complicated political nexus of accountability
Rise of medical ‘patient-agent’ representatives
 But had own political agendas
 Preponderance of ‘bad news’ stories
Soft Budget Constraint
 Insulation against failure 
 more risky decisions/less ardent pursuit of savings
SUGGESTIONS FOR AMELIORATION
(Howell, 2001)
Locally-elected, rather than ministerially appointed, 
boards
 But in control of own destiny, decision-making (including full 
responsibility for consequences of failure)
Competition at purchaser level
 Better information for satisfaction, service provision
 Encouraging improved provider, service variety
Removal of geographic monopolies where feasible
NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS 
Meet most of these requirements
 Elected citizen  boards
 Provider competition where feasible
 Theoretically possible for PCTs to compete
Therefore greater chance of NHS reforms delivering 
anticipated gains
BUT
Still some areas of concern
Membership dilemmas
 Autonomy and risks of failure
 Accountability and information sharing
MEMBERSHIP
Members
 Local residents
 Patients in last 3 years
 Employees
 Representatives of partner organisations
Board 
Majority elected by members
 Appointees from partner organisations, commissioning PCTs 
and universities undertaking teaching, research at hospital
MEMBERSHIP DILEMMAS
How members account to non-members
Protecting against actions of vested/conflicting 
interests
Membership bias
 Costs of membership vs benefits
 Adverse selection – staff, disaffected patients, advocacy groups
 Staff – able to gain balance of power/influence decisionmaking
No countering balance from a shareholder/owner
Precluded from membership/governance roles in typical nonprofit
Potential solution
 True resident member co-operative
 Advisory role only for staff
AUTONOMY AND RISKS OF FAILURE
Rewards/sanctions for outcomes beyond board’s 
control 
 Less ardent pursuit of any actions for fear of incurring 
sanctions (Holmstrom and Milgrom)
Minimum standards, remuneration for services 
levels set centrally
 Patients may require different services, quantities, qualities
may hold board to account electorally for not complying
Costs to board members’ reputations for bearing someone 
else’s risks
constrains incentive for higher quality members offering selves;
leaving only lower-calibre candidates => poorer quality 
decisions 
RISK-SEEKING AND THE SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINT
Central intervention in event of NHS Foundation 
Trust financial or operational failure
Higher likelihood of board pursuing more risky 
projects (e.g. at behest of patients) and such 
projects continuing longer before being identified 
as failures and discontinued
 No loss of service to community
 No personal cost to board members
 Fewer incentives for patients to monitor/report on activities
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Positive rewards for exemplary board performance
– e.g. retirement bonuses, civic awards
Debarring failed board members from similar 
positions
Avoiding mismatches between allocation of risks, 
costs and decisionmaking powers
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMATION 
SHARING
Conflict between statutory and electoral duties
 Favouring incentives that offer greatest reward – especially 
acute for appointed board members
Elected members seeking to retain office
 Total voter reliance on voluntarily disclosed information for 
assessing board member performance
 Concealing information easier in absence of commercial 
trading information – voluntary disclosure of adverse 
information extremely unlikely (Prendergast)
Requires higher disclosure requirements than usual
 e.g. fully public meetings, fully open books, permission to 
disclose rather than obligation to release on request
WHAT CAN NZ LEARN FROM OBSERVING 
THE NHS REFORMS?
Power of the staff board member
Interest group capture vs. public voter apathy
Cohesiveness of the mixed appointment/elected 
board
Calibre of decision-makers
threats to reputation from bearing risks outside of decision-
makers’ control limiting decision-making quality
Other issues?
CONCLUSION
Institutional design challenges posed by continued 
public ownership but divested control are 
complex
 If not well-considered, may thwart ability to achieve desired 
outcomes
